Federal Jurisdiction--Pendent Claims--Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction Applies to Claim of Second Plaintiff--\u3cem\u3eWilson v. American Chain & Cable co.; Newman v. Freeman by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 2 
1967 
Federal Jurisdiction--Pendent Claims--Doctrine of Pendent 
Jurisdiction Applies to Claim of Second Plaintiff--Wilson v. 
American Chain & Cable co.; Newman v. Freeman 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Federal Jurisdiction--Pendent Claims--Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction Applies to 
Claim of Second Plaintiff--Wilson v. American Chain & Cable co.; Newman v. Freeman, 66 MICH. L. REV. 
373 (1967). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-PENDENT CLAIMS-Doctrine 
of Pendent Jurisdiction Applies to Claim of 
Second Plaintiff-Wilson v. American Chain 
& Cable Co.*; Newman v. Freeman** 
In Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co.,1 plaintiff, whose son 
was injured by a defective lawnmower, brought a diversity action in 
federal district court on behalf of his son against the manufacturer, 
alleging damages in excess of the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum.2 
Simultaneously, plaintiff sought recovery in his own name for med-
ical bills and the expense of orthopedic shoes resulting from the 
injury. Because the latter claim was for less than $10,000, it was dis-
missed by the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, held, inter alia, the claim of the 
father was erroneously dismissed. Where two claims arising from the 
same injury are brought on behalf of two members of the same 
household, but only one claim satisfies the requisite jurisdictional 
amount, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction may properly be in-
voked to eliminate the normal requirement that each claim inde-
pendently meet the jurisdictional standard. 
In a related case, Newman v. Freeman,4 a New Jersey guardian 
was appointed to bring an action on behalf of an injured Pennsyl-
vania minor against the allegedly negligent Pennsylvania defendant, 
thus creating diversity of citizenship between the initial parties. The 
federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania per-
mitted the minor's father, also a Pennsylvania resident, to append 
his own claim against the defendant to the main claim, even though 
the normal requirement of "maximum diversity" of citizenship be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants was thereby circumvented. 
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is a judicially created5 ex-
• 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966). 
u 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
1. 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966). 
2, The statute authorizing federal court jurisdiction based upon diversity of citi-
zenship reads in part as follows: "(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy e.xceeds the sum or value of 
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(!) citizens of different 
States ••.. " 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). 
3. The father's claim was also dismissed on the alternative ground that he was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
4. 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
5. See Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Siler v. Louisville 8: Nash. R.R., 213 
U.S. 175 (1909). The application of pendent jurisdiction in one context was subse-
quently given statutory authority in 1948. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), enacted in that year, 
provides as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and 
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tension of federal jurisdiction based upon considerations of judicial 
economy and convenience to the parties.6 Traditionally, it has been 
defined7 as a device which permits a plaintiff suing in federal court 
on a federally created right8 to seek relief at the same time on a 
properly related nonfederal claim over which the court would have 
no jurisdiction if it were being litigated alone.9 The proper relation-
ship that must exist between the two claims to justify pendent juris-
diction has not been entirely clear.10 The original test laid down by 
the Supreme Court in the 1933 case of Hurn v. Oursler11 was that 
related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws." See Note, The Doctrine 
of Hurn v. Oursler and the New Judicial Gode, 37 IowA L. REv. 406 (1952). 
6. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Wilson v. American 
Chain &: Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1966). 
7. See, e.g., w. MOORE &: D. VESTAL, MOORE'S MANUAL §§ 5.07, 5.15 (1967); Note, 
The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal 
Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding 
Concept in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1965); 5 A.L.R.3d 1040 
(1966). 
8. The term "federally-created right" in this context means a substantive right created 
by the Constitution or a law of the United States. In addition to patent, copyright 
and trademark rights, it includes those rights commonly referred to as presenting 
"federal questions." See generally W. MooRE & D. VESTAL, MooRE's :MANUAL §§ 5.02-.03 
(1967). 
9. Pendent jurisdiction which covers the specific case of extending jurisdiction to 
certain nonfederal claims that the plaintiff has against the same defendant where a 
related claim is originally within the federal court's jurisdiction should be distin-
guished at this point from the related doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Unfortunately, 
however, the relation between the two has seldom been clear. Compare, e.g., 1 ·w. 
BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (Wright ed. 1960), 
which recognizes pendent only as an example of ancillary, with Note, Pendent Juris-
diction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IOWA L. REv. 151, 
155-56 n.29 (1965), which implies precisely the opposite, stating that pendent is the 
broader of the two doctrines. Nevertheless, the hard-core meanings of the two can be 
distinguished. Ancillary jurisdiction was originally created to enable a federal court to 
adjudicate all claims pertaining to property under its custody or control. Freeman v. 
Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). The doctrine was later expanded, however, to 
cover situations in which a federal court found it necessary to hear a related claim, 
over which it otherwise lacked jurisdiction, in order to effectuate a complete, effective, 
and equitable disposition of the rights and liabilities asserted in another claim over 
which it had already exercised jurisdiction. A typical example of this expanded appli-
cation is the enjoining of a contemporaneous state court proceeding on the same or 
related claim as that pending in the federal court. See l '\V. BARRON &: A. HoLTZOFF, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 23 (Wright ed. 1960). Finally, ancillary jurisdiction, 
unlike pendent jurisdiction, is always mandatory. See Note, supra. 
A large number of claims adjudicated in federal courts fall into what might best 
be described as an area of overlap. Counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims, 
while usually referred to as ancillary, and while a part of the federal courts' manda• 
tory jurisdiction, are not ancillary in the strictest sense that they must be adjudicated 
with the main claim in order to insure an effective or equitable remedy. Rather, they 
are permitted to be litigated with the main claim largely for reasons of judicial 
economy and party convenience, considerations more applicable to the basic notion 
of pendent jurisdiction. 
· 10. See Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court Juris• 
diction, 51 IowA L. REv. 151, 152-53 (1965); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the 
Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1026· 
30 (1962); 5 A.L.R.3d 1040, 1068-73 (1966). 
11. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). 
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(1) the claims must arise out of the same "cause of action," and 
(2) the federal claim must not be "plainly insubstantial."12 In Hurn, 
the plaintiff brought an action in federal court alleging a claim un-
der federal copyright law and also a claim under the state common-
law doctrine of unfair competition. The t:1v-o claims were based upon 
the same facts. Jurisdiction over the copyright claim was conferred 
by a federal statute13 which gave exclusive copyright jurisdiction to 
the federal courts, but no jurisdiction would have existed over the 
unfair competition claim if it had been brought alone since there 
was neither a federally created right involved nor diversity of citizen-
ship between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine 
of pendent jurisdiction should have been applied to the nonfederal 
claim and that it was error for the lower court to dismiss that claim 
merely because the copyright claim was eventually decided against 
the plaintiff. 
Arguably, the "one cause of action" test of Hurn, which would 
encompass the case of a single plaintiff asserting two claims, would 
not extend to cases like 'Wilson and Newman where two plaintiffs 
are suing, each on a single claim.14 The Hurn approach, however, 
dependent upon some chimerical distinction between separate 
"cause of action" and separate "grounds for relief,"15 caused consid-
12. Id. at 246. 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964) provides in pertinent part as follows: "(a) The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be 
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent and copyright cases." 
14. The term "cause of action" often takes on different meanings in different con• 
texts, but in general it is the right to recover a judgment on a claim which accrues 
to one person when one of his legal rights has been invaded. If defined in these terms, 
a single cause of action would be limited to a single plaintiff alleging a single wrong 
against a single defendant. Thus two plaintiffs, unless they were asserting a "joint 
right" would necessarily have separate causes of action. For a discussion of the various 
theories as to what constitutes a single cause of action, see Clark, The Code Cause of 
Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924); Gavit, The Code Cause of Action: Joinder and Coun-
terclaiu1s, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 802 (1930); McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 
YALE L.J. 614 (1925). 
While the single-plaintiff definition of "cause of action" would explain the failure 
of pendent jurisdiction to be applied in the two-plaintiff situation under the single 
cause of action test of Hurn, a few cases have so extended the doctrine. See Borror v. 
Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore, 186 F. 
Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960); text accompanying notes 20-24 infra. 
15. The Supreme Court in Hurn drew a distinction between two common situ-
ations. The first involves the assertion of two separate grounds in support of a single 
cause of action, only one of which is normally cognizable in a federal court; the second 
concerns the allegation of two distinct causes of action, again only one of which meets 
the federal jurisdictional requirements. An example of the former situation is pro• 
vided by the Hurn case in which the defendant allegedly copied the plaintiff's play 
without his permission. This single action by the defendant, if proved, would have 
violated both the federal copyright law as well as the state unfair competition law-
two separate grounds for relief. An example of the latter situation would be a defen-
dant who has allegedly copied from two plays written by a plaintiff, only one of 
which is copyrighted. The claim arising from the non-copyrighted play could not be 
appended under the Hurn test because it is a separate cause of action. 
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erable confusion among the courts.16 Recognizing this conceptual 
difficulty, the Supreme Court in the recent case of United Mine-
workers v. Gibbs17 reviewed the problem and found the rather lim-
ited approach of Hurn unnecesarily grudging. As a more suitable 
standard, it proposed the following: 
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of 
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or 
state characters, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily 
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assum-
ing substantiality of the federal issues there is power in federal 
courts to hear the whole.1s 
Thus, Gibbs seems to have done away with the single cause of action 
requirement and directs a broader inquiry into the relationship of 
the two claims asserted. Although Gibbs was factually similar to 
Hurn in that it involved the traditional situation of one plaintiff 
asserting alternative federal and state claims, its underlying philoso-
phy appears to encompass the two-plaintiff, diversity jurisdiction 
complex which confronted the courts in the Wilson and Newman 
cases.19 
In addition to its reliance on Gibbs, the court in Wilson cited 
several recent lower court decisions, rendered even before Gibbs, 
which upheld the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in similar mul-
tiple-plaintiff situations. In Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore,20 the 
plaintiff sued both in his individual capacity and as administrator 
of his wife's estate. Both claims grew out of his wife's death, which 
had been caused by an explosion at the defendant's place of business 
where plaintiff's wife had been employed. Although the amount of 
the claim of the plaintiff-administrator was less than the jurisdic-
tional minimum, the court allowed it to be litigated with that of 
the plaintiff-husband "in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions.''21 
Raybould apparently was the first case to allow a state claim to ap-
pend to a federal diversity claim rather than to a federal question 
claim. Of course, traditionally, a single plaintiff has been allowed 
to aggregate as many claims as he may have against a defendant in 
16. See Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Proce-
dure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 397-410 (1936); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision 
of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 216, 232 (1948). 
17. 383 U.S. 715 (1966); noted in 80 HARv. L. REv. 220 (1966) and Ill LOYOLA L. REV. 
167 (1966) and 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1631 (1966). 
18. 383 U.S. at 725. 
19. Of course, the literal language of Gibbs refers to a plaintiffs claims, and one 
could thus read Gibbs as not extending to the case involving multiple-plaintiffs. 
20. 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960). See also Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 827 
F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title &: Trust Co., 261 
F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1966). 
21. 186 F. Supp. at 236. 
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determining whether the jurisdictional amount is met.22 Thus, 
while the bringing of a $10,000 claim and a $3,000 claim by a single 
plaintiff could be viewed as an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, it 
has always been thought of in terms of an aggregation of separate 
claims.23 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that Raybould can 
be explained as a single plaintiff aggregation case since there is 
really only a single plaintiff who is suing in different capacities.24 
Furthermore, even on a theory of pendent jurisdiction, Raybould 
can be defended, for there appears to be no sound reason for restrict-
ing the application of pendent jurisdiction to cases involving federal 
question claims.25 However, the application of pendent jurisdiction 
in a case like Newman does pose a serious threat of additional intru-
sion into state court jurisdiction, since the mere appointment of an 
out-of-state guardian acted to deprive the state court of two claims. 
The real objecion in Newman, however, lies with the ease of creat-
ing federal jurisdiction by such appointment and the problem 
should be attacked at that point rather than by limiting pendent 
jurisdiction.26 And, at least, the convenience of the parties and the 
courts is promoted in Newman by allocating the judicial business 
to a single court even if one is still uneasy that the federal rather 
than the state court is hearing the lawsuit. 
Another case decided prior to Gibbs, Morris v. Gimbel Bros.,27 
foreshadowed the decisions in ·wilson and Newman. In Morris, a 
husband's claim for loss of consortium and services was heard with 
22. See, e.g., Richie v. Richie, 186 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); cases cited l W. 
BARRON&: A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE&: PROCEDURE§ 24 n.56.4 (Wright ed. 1960). 
23. See Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount Requirement and Joinder of 
Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 IND. L.J. 199 (1952). 
24. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 36 n.12 (1963). 
25. In the past a notion somewhat akin to pendent jurisdiction has allowed claims 
related to a legitimate federal claim to be litigated together with the federal claim 
under the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts. Prior to the enactment of 28 
U.S.C, § 144l(c) (1964), an interpretation of the Separable Controversy Act of 1875, 
18 Stat. 470, allowed separable, but not separate, claims to be removed along with 
the main claim, to a federal court. See Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1880), A 
theory of ancillary jurisdiction might be used to explain the result but removal of 
the separable cause of action was merely assumed to be an exception to the require-
ment of maximum diversity. 
In Om v. Universal Auto. Ass'n, 198 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1961), the court relied 
on the "separate and independent claim" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 144l(c) (1964) to 
retain jurisdiction of a claim for less than the minimum jurisdictional amount in a 
removal case. This case also lends support to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in 
cases like Wilson and Newman. 
26. For a discussion of this type of "created" federal jurisdiction and a recom-
mendation that it be judicially curtailed, see Coham & Tate, Manufacturing Federal 
Diversit1• Jurisdiction by Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriely, 
I VILL. L. R.Ev. 201 (1956); Note, Appointment of Non-Resident Administrators To 
Create Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 873 (1964). See also AMERICAN LAw 
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF JURISDICTION, (OFFICIAL DRAFr) pt. 1, at § 1307 (1965). 
27. 246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965). 
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the wife's claim for personal injuries despite the fact that there was 
not even "the remotest possibility" of a verdict for the husband "of 
$10,000 or anything like it."28 The federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited only one authority20 for its 
application of pendent jurisdiction to those facts, but it did note 
that "Pennsylvania has long recognized the complementary nature 
of the actions of husband and wife where the wife was injured."30 
The court reasoned that since the recoveries on both claims would 
depend on the severity and duration of the wife's injuries, it would 
be both advantageous and proper to try the two claims together.31 
Rules 2228(b) and 2232 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure32 further support the decisions in the principal cases (both 
of which involved federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania). These 
rules provide that when claims resulting from an injury to a minor 
accrue both to the minor and to his parent or guardian, the two 
claims must be presented in a single action if at all. While these 
rules were not interpreted as providing a potential bar to the father's 
later access to the state court or as binding in any way upon the 
federal forum,33 the federal court in Wilson chose to "give recog· 
nition" to the state procedure.34 It is, of course, appropriate for a 
federal court to effectuate state policy as long as it does not violate 
28. Id. at 986. 
29 • .Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964). The court did not cite 
Raybould although the facts of that case were identical to those in Borror. 
30. 246 F. Supp at 986. 
31. Id. The decisions in Raybould, Borror and Morris appear to have disregarded 
earlier holdings to the contrary. See, e.g., Sobel v. National Fruit Product Co., 213 
F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Pa. 
1960); Bell v. Mykytiuk, 135 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Anicola v. J. C. Penny Co., 
98 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Pa. 1951). However, they do appear to be more consistent with 
the gradual expansion of pendent jurisdiction. The ancestry of the doctrine can be 
traced back as far as the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), but its first important articulation did 
not come until 1909 in Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175. Twenty-four 
years later the doctrine was significantly expanded in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 
(1933). See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text. Recent evidence of continued 
expansion appears to be present in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 
(1966), where the Court enunciated the broadest definition of pendent jurisdiction to 
date. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra. 
32. Rule 2228(b) provides in pertinent part: 
If an injury, not resulting in death, is inflicted upon the person of a minor, and 
causes of action therefor accrue to the minor and also to the parent or parents 
of the minor, they shall be enforced in one action brought by the parent or 
parents and the child. 
Rule 2232(a) provides as follows: 
The cause of action of a person required to join in an action as a party plaintiff 
by Rule 2228 shall be barred by failing to join therein if the defendant has given 
such person such notice of the pendency of the action as the court by general 
rule or special order may direct. 
33. The rules are clearly "procedural" and therefore not binding on a federal 
court under the test laid down in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and 
subsequently developed in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) and Byrd v • 
.Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
34. 364 F .2d at 564. 
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any of its own rules or the federal laws.35 In Newman, however, it 
is arguable that the policy of joining the claims of the minor and 
parent is at odds with the federal policies of refusing to hear "manu-
factured" diversity claims and of requiring maximum diversity be-
tween parties. Presumably, the father in the Newman case could 
have been appointed as his son's guardian, joined his own claim for 
expenses, and litigated the entire action in the state court. Perhaps, 
then, pendent jurisdiction should not be exercised in cases like 
Newman where all of the real parties involved are Pennsylvania 
citizens.36 
The Wilson and Newman courts pointed to the desirable policies 
that are advanced by permitting the two claims to be litigated to-
gether. Because the proof necessary to establish each of the claims 
is to a large extent the same, except on the issue of damages, all 
litigation arising from the accident can be disposed of with a mini-
mum expenditure of judicial time. Moreover, the corresponding 
reduction of litigational anxiety and expense significantly benefits 
the parties. It is true, of course, that considerations of convenience 
can never alone be determinative of a jurisdictional question.37 
However, where the statute being construed does not speak directly 
to the problem and where the intrusion into state court jurisdiction 
is minimal,38 considerations of economy and convenience take on 
added weight. 
A further justification for the extension of pendent jurisdiction 
in these cases is the present paradox which results when the liberal 
joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are con-
trasted with the practice of giving restrictive interpretation to juris-
dictional statutes.39 The letter and spirit of the Rules provide a 
framework for resolving in a single action all claims arising from 
one transaction or occurrence,40 but the jurisdictional statutes often 
35. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 
(194'7). 
36. The argument can be made that pendent jurisdiction in the multiple-plaintiff 
situation should be limited to the deficient jurisdictional amount claim and should 
not be applied where non-diverse parties will append. On the other hand, the preser-
vation of maximum diversity at the cost of litigating essentially the same action in 
separate courts does not appear desirable. 
37. The authors of a leading article on federal jurisdiction made this point as 
follows: "The extent to which a federal court may permit various claims to be pre-
sented in an action is determined • • • not merely by considerations of convenience 
but also by notions as to the proper functions of the federal courts and their relation 
to the courts of the states." Shulman &: Jaegerman, supra note 16, at 393. 
38. See discussion in text at pp. 380-81 infra. 
39. This continuing paradox was cited by the court in Raybould as a reason for 
its decision: "Surely it would be contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the 
[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to require that this litigation be split between two 
courts." Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore, 186 F. Supp. 235, 236 (E.D. Mich. 1960). See 
generally Clark &: Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II. Pleadings and Parties, 
44 YALE L.J. 1291 (1935); Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 968 (1951). 
40. See, e.g., FED. R. Cxv. P. 13 (1967) (counterclaim and cross-claim), 14 (third-party 
practice). See also Clark &: Moore, supra note 39. 
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prevent the federal courts from hearing such claims. It is arguable 
that an expansion of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine was intended 
as the vehicle for resolving this apparent conflict.41 
There are, of course, considerations which indicate that the 
Pennsylvania district courts should not have extended the pendent 
jurisdiction doctrine to the multiple-plaintiff situation. Determina-
tions of jurisdiction should be easily made at the outset of the liti-
gation. Any exceptions to or extensions of the present scope of the 
doctrine might endanger that policy. In the principal cases, however, 
the holdings were carefully limited to situations in which a second 
plaintiff appended a claim which was derived from a jurisdictionally 
valid claim of a member of his own household. Whether a future 
case falls into that category should prove immediately determinable 
by the trial court at the pleading stage. 
Possibly the most compelling factor opposing an extension of 
pendent jurisdiction is that diversity jurisdiction was not created by 
Congress to provide a forum for everyone; thus, any judicial ex-
pansion of that jurisdiction at the expense of state courts must be 
examined to insure that some relevant federal policy is being effec-
tuated. In Wilson, the thrust of the court's argument was that the 
father and the son were, in a real sense, the "same" plaintiff, and 
that the son was prevented from suing for the full amount of the 
damages caused by the defendant's negligence only because he was 
not financially able to pay his own medical bills.42 Since Congress 
had made a determination that the son's claim may be litigated in 
federal court, it is difficult to understand an objection to hearing 
the father's claim for medical bills at the same time. The same ra-
tionale can be used in Newman. Given judicial submission to the 
appointment of an out-of-state guardian as a means for acquiring 
diversity jurisdiction,43 the father's claim should likewise be heard. 
The objection that there is a greater intrusion into state judicial 
business because there are now two claims in the federal court on 
the basis of an artificial diversity must be weighed against the ab-
41. See Shulman &: Jaegerman, supra note 16. 
42. 364 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1966) ("The father's claim is not independent from 
the claim which he made on behalf of his minor son, for the father's damages flowed 
to him from the injury which the son suffered and are ancillary to the son's claim."). 
43. By enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964), Congress appeared to have provided a 
remedy for the collusive suit. It provides that a district court shall not have juris-
diction of a civil action "in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been 
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 
Judicial interpretation, however, has rendered the section largely ineffective. See, e.g., 
Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1959); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 
F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959). See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 25; Coham 
&: Tate, supra note 25; Note, Appointment of Non-Resident Administrators To Create 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 873 (1964). 
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surdity of fracturing the claims and allowing the state court to hear 
one while the federal court adjudicates the other. 
In evaluating the Wilson and Newman decisions, one must not 
lose sight of the narrowness of the courts' holdings. These decisions 
do not allow separate plaintiffs to aggregate their claims to achieve 
the jurisdictional minimum. One plaintiff must always have legiti-
mate access to the federal court on his mvn. Nor do the decisions 
allow a second member of the same household to append a juris-
dictionally deficient claim for his own nonderivative injury to the 
claim of the main plaintiff. In that type of situation there is less 
overlapping evidence, and dismissing the second claim is less like 
forcing the "same" plaintiff to sue in two different courts. And, 
when pendent jurisdiction in the multiple-plaintiff situation is lim-
ited to a derivative claim by the second plaintiff, there will be little 
incentive to invent an artificial federal claim in order to litigate a 
state claim in a federal court, since there will be no chance of recov-
ering on the pendent claim if the claim independently before the 
court is defeated. 
Finally, the potential added intrusion into the domain of state 
courts is small. In very few cases will a federal court engage in an 
additional construction or application of state law that would not 
have been involved in the main claim. Except for a few cases where 
the parent or spouse will be defending a charge such as contributory 
negligence, the only additional determination to be made by the 
court will be assessment of the second plaintiff's damages. 
